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The California Environmental Quality
Act: Alternative Site Analysis
Requirements in Environmental Impact
Reports
The California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) was
promulgated for the purpose of protecting the environment
through the reporting and disclosure of environmental impacts.
The reporting process requires the consideration of alternative
project sites. Currently, local agencies and project developers de-
termine which alternative sites will be reviewed to meet this re-
quirement. This article addresses whether a sufficient range of
alternative sites are being considered under CEQA and which par-
ties should be involved in the choice.
INTRODUCTION
Undeveloped land is a valuable and limited resource in California.
As land development pressures continue to increase in California,'
land-use planners, government agencies, and city officials will have
to make difficult and important decisions. The land-use decisions
that are made today will have widespread effects on the quality of
life and the environment far into the future.
Considering alternatives is an important part of any land-use deci-
sion.2 If city officials and planners make land-use decisions without
1. Peter Navarro, The Growth Nightmare: A Worst-Case Scenario for San Di-
ego's Future, SAN DIEGO UNION, July 28, 1991, at C-1, C-7. By the year 2005, the
population of San Diego County is expected to increase by one million persons. This
mass infusion of population will put incredible burdens on an already limited land base.
Outlying undeveloped areas of the county will be placed under incredible economic pres-
sure to allow development on property currently zoned agricultural and rural. SAN DI-
EGO UNION, September 21, 1991, at A-23. The problems of population pressures on land
resources are not restricted to San Diego County. The entire state of California can
expect dramatic population growth. During the 1990s California's population is expected
to grow by six million persons. Id.
2. Although this Comment is limited to the discussion of alternative site analysis
under the California Environmental Quality Act, most environmental legislation includes
provisions for the consideration of alternatives. See The National Environmental Policy
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332 (1970); Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43
U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1712(c)(6) (1976). Many individual states also employ some form of
considering potential project alternatives, many communities may be
burdened with planning errors and the misallocation of resources. In
order to ensure the optimum use of our land resources, a wide range
of project alternatives should be considered before a new project is
approved.3
This Comment discusses the background and the present state of
alternative site analysis in California land-use decisions under the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). This Comment
also addresses the issues of whether the optimum range of alterna-
tives are being considered in land-use decisions and which organiza-
tions should be involved in the choice of alternatives. Currently
under CEQA, local agencies and project developers determine which
alternatives to consider in land-use decisions.5 However, these parties
alone may not have sufficient incentive to find and consider the opti-
mum range of project alternatives. Project opponents, the groups
with the greatest incentive to find project alternatives, are not cur-
rently allowed to directly submit their alternative choices for in-
depth environmental review. As a result, fewer project alternatives
are being considered in these important land-use decisions.
Section I of this Comment discusses CEQA's legislative intent,
background, and procedural workings. Section II surveys four repre-
sentative decisions interpreting Environmental Impact Report re-
quirements under CEQA. These four cases demonstrate how early
court decisions interpreted CEQA to broaden the depth and scope of
environmental analysis in Environmental Impact Reports. Section
III traces the development of alternative site analysis under CEQA
through appellate and supreme court case law. Section III concludes
with an analysis of the expansive supreme court decision in Laurel
Heights.6
Section IV addresses the recent supreme court decision in Citizens
of Goleta Valley.7 The Goleta decision propounded a new direction
in alternative site analysis under CEQA, guided by the principle of
"feasibility." With the Goleta decision, the scope of potential project
environmental impact review in their land-use decisions. See Nicholas A. Robinson, En-
vironmental Impact Review in the States, 307 PRAC. L. INST.. REAL EST. 403 (1988).
3. See infra discussion of requirement for inclusion of alternatives in Environmen-
tal Impact Reports at text accompanying note 33.
4. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21000-176 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). The state legis-
lature also authorized the promulgation of administrative regulations for the implemen-
tation of CEQA. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15000-387 (1991) ("CEQA Guidelines,"
"State EIR Guidelines").
5. See infra text accompanying note 140-41.
6. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n of San Francisco, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of
Cal., 47 Cal. 3d 376, 764 P.2d 278, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988); see infra text accompa-
nying notes 115-22.
7. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Cal. 3d 553, 801 P.2d
1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990); see infra text accompanying notes 124-43.
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alternative locations narrowed as lead agencies8 and developers could
pre-screen alternatives from discussion in the environmental analysis.
Finally, Section V explores the potential problems of alternative
site analysis after Goleta. Allowing lead agencies and project devel-
opers to pre-screen project alternatives causes three problems: (1)
the range of alternatives is reduced, (2) the public is excluded from
the "analytic route" of the alternative site analysis, and (3) the se-
quence of events as outlined in the CEQA guidelines and case law is
circumvented. Section V also sets forth a proposal that the Califor-
nia Legislature amend CEQA. CEQA should be amended to allow
direct public participation in the selection of alternatives addressed
in Environmental Impact Reports. Direct public participation would
have tangible benefits upon land-use decisions. A wider range of al-
ternatives would be addressed in Environmental Impact Reports. In
addition, the public would be encouraged to participate earlier in the
project review process and CEQA-related litigation would be
reduced.
I. BACKGROUND, LEGISLATIVE INTENT, AND PROCEDURAL
WORKINGS OF THE CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY ACT
In 1970, the California Legislature enacted the broadest environ-
mental legislation in the state under the title of the California Envi-
ronmental Quality Act (CEQA). CEQA was enacted to remedy a
very specific deficiency in land-use planning. Public agencies were
approving projects without considering the environmental effects of
those projects.10 CEQA was implemented to require agencies to per-
form a new, separate analysis of a project from an environmental
standpoint."
8. See infra note 35.
9. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-176 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15000-387 (1991).
10. Brief of Amici Curiae Sierra Club, Save California, Land Utilization Alliance,
Stop Polluting Our Newport, and Friends of the Irvine Coast in Support of Appellant
Citizens of Goleta Valley at 4, Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Cal.
3d 553, 801 P.2d 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990) (No. S013629) [hereinafter Brief of
Amici Curiae Sierra Club]. The Amicus brief provides an overview of the purpose of the
enactment of CEQA to support the view that the legislature intended Environmental
Impact Reports, see infra note 11, to be purely environmental documents.
11. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061 (West 1986). The separate environmental analy-
sis required by CEQA is called an Environmental Impact Report (EIR). See infra text
accompanying notes 41-44 for an overview of content requirements for EIRs.
The primary study that led to the enactment of CEQA was a leg-
islative staff study known as the Environmental Bill of Rights. 2 The
California Assembly Select Committee on Environmental Quality
prepared the study, which recommended policy changes to address
the need for environmental protection. 3 The study revealed that de-
velopment in California was uncoordinated, fragmented, and that
there was little understanding of environmental consequences. The
report concluded that "an orderly process that prevents environmen-
tal damage, better identifies the true costs and consequences of our
public and private actions, and prevents over-commitment of our
limited resources" must be implemented.14 After further study, the
legislature enacted CEQA. CEQA required agencies to consider en-
vironmental impact in a separate, complete analysis called an Envi-
ronmental Impact Report (EIR) .15
CEQA guidelines are binding on all public agencies in Califor-
nia. 6 The general purpose of CEQA is to provide information to the
public and appropriate officials regarding the environmental conse-
quences of development decisions before they are made.1 7 Addition-
ally, the CEQA guidelines seek to compel government decision-
12. The California Assembly Select Committee on Environmental Quality was
charged with proposing an "Environmental Bill of Rights" and legislative action to pro-
tect California's environment. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS 13 (March 1970).
13. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTE ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, EN-
VIRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS (March 1970).
14. CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY.
ENVIRONMENTAL BILL OF RIGHTS 20 (March 1970). In proposing the passage of an En-
vironmental Quality Act, the committee acknowledged that the "preparation of Environ-
mental Impact Reports by all levels of California government will not automatically
prevent all environmental degradation" but the reports "will provide the initial steps for
applying an orderly process" for considering environmental impact. Id. at 21; see also
Brief of Amici Curiae Sierra Club, supra note 10, at 5.
15. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061 (West 1986) defines an EIR as:
[a]n informational document which, ... shall be considered by every public
agency prior to its approval or disapproval of a project. The purpose of an
environmental impact report is to provide public agencies and the public in
general with detailed information about the effect which a proposed project is
likely to have on the environment; to list ways in which the significant effects of
such a project might be minimized; and to indicate alternatives to such a
project.
See also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21100, 21151 (West 1986). Section 21100 sets forth
the EIR requirements for state agencies. An almost identical requirement for local agen-
cies is found at § 21151. EIR content requirements can also be found at CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15120-132 (1991).
16. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15000 (1991). Sections 15000-387 make up the
state CEQA guidelines which implement, the provisions of CEQA. The Supreme Court of
California has still not determined whether the guidelines are regulatory mandates orjust aids in interpreting CEQA. In any event, the courts give the guidelines great weight
unless they are clearly erroneous under CEQA. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of
Supervisors, 52 Cal. 3d 553, 564, 801 P.2d 1161, 1167, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410, 416 (1990).
17. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 47 Cal. 3d
376, 764 P.2d 278, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988). See infra discussion of the Laurel
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makers at all levels to make their decisions with these environmental
consequences in mind."8
A. Basic Legislative Policies and Goals
The California Legislature described four basic objectives of
CEQA:
(1) To inform governmental decision-makers and the public about poten-
tially significant environmental effects of proposed activities; 9
(2) To identify the ways in which environmental damage can be avoided or
significantly reduced;29
(3) To prevent significant, avoidable damage to the environment by requir-
ing changes in projects through the use of alternatives or mitigation
measures when the agency finds the changes to be feasible;21 and
(4) To disclose to the public the reasons why a governmental agency ap-
proved the project in the manner the agency chose if significant envi-
ronmental effects are involved. 22
In addition to the above four objectives, when the legislature en-
acted CEQA, the legislature pronounced a series of broad policy
statements to guide the implementation of CEQA. The seven legisla-
tive policy goals were as follows:
(1) The maintenance of a quality environment for the people of this state
now and in the future is a matter of statewide concern.
(2) It is necessary to provide a high-quality environment that at all times is
healthful and pleasing to the senses and the intellect of man.
(3) There is a need to understand the relationship between the maintenance
of high-quality ecological systems and the general welfare of the people
of the state, including their enjoyment of the natural resources of the
state.
(4) The capacity of the environment is limited, and it is the intent of the
Legislature that the government of the state take immediate steps to
identify critical thresholds for the health and safety of the people of the
state and take all coordinated actions necessary to prevent such thresh-
olds being reached.
(5) Every citizen has a responsibility to contribute to" the preservation and
enhancement of the environment.
(6) The interrelationship of policies and practices in the management of
natural resources and waste disposal requires systematic and concerted
efforts by public and private interests to enhance environmental quality
and to control environmental pollution.
Heights decision at text accompanying notes 115-22.
18. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 393, 764 P.2d at 278, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 431(quoting Bozung v. Local Agency Reform Comm., 13 Cal. 3d 263, 529 P.2d 1017, 118
Cal. Rptr. 249 (1975)).
19. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(a) (1991).
20. Id. § 15002(b).
21. Id. § 15002(c).
22. Id. § 15002(d).
(7) It is the intent of the legislature that all agencies of the state govern-
ment which regulate activities of private individuals, corporations, and
public agencies which are found to affect the quality of the environ-
ment, shall regulate such activities so that major consideration is given
to preventing environmental damage, while providing a decent home
and satisfying living environment for every Californian. 23
The legislature also stated that it was state policy to "take all
action necessary to protect, rehabilitate, and enhance the environ-
mental quality of the state."2 4
Another state policy goal was to "[e]nsure that the long-term pro-
tection of the environment, ... shall be the guiding criterion in pub-
lic decisions. 25
Generally, courts have given the broad policy statements and lan-
guage of CEQA much deference. California appellate courts and the
supreme court have stated that the language of CEQA should be
"interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible protec-
tion to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory
language." 6 The difficulties arise in determining what lies within
that "reasonable scope." Before discussing the difficulties in inter-
preting the reasonableness of the legislative policy statements, it is
important to understand how the environmental review process
works and the role CEQA plays in that process.
B. Overview and Procedural Workings of CEQA
Since CEQA's enactment in 1970, CEQA guidelines have under-
gone numerous updates and changes.2 7 One of the most dramatic
23. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21000(a)-(g) (West 1986).
24. Id. § 21001(a) (emphasis added).
25. Id. § 21001(d) (emphasis added). Initially this code section read, "Ensure the
long-term protection of the environment . . .is the guiding criterion in public decison
making." After the landmark Friends of Mammoth decision, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d
1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972), the California Legislature added to the code the phrase
"consistent with the provision of a decent home and suitable living environment for every
Californian." Act of Sept. 22, 1979, ch. 947, § 5(d), 1979 Cal. Stat. 3269, 3271. See
infra text accompanying notes 60-62.
26. Friends of Mammoth, 8 Cal. 3d at 259, 502 P.2d at 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
768. This case was the first interpretation of CEQA by the California Supreme Court.
The court broadly interpreted the CEQA guidelines to have the strongest effect possible
to provide environmental protection under CEQA. See infra text accompanying notes 60-
62.
27. CEQA was amended in 1972 after the Friends of Mammoth decision, 8 Cal.
3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972), under AB 889, Stats. 1972, ch. 1154,
p. 2271 (expanding scope of projects under CEQA); in 1976 under the Knox Bill, AB
2679, Stats. 1976, ch. 1312, p. 5888 (creating new provisions for public notice, streamlin-
ing EIR preparation, and adding time limits for preparation of EIRs by lead agencies);
in 1977 under the Permit Streamlining Act, AB 884, Stats. 1977, ch. 1200, p. 3993(government agency approval of private projects must be complete within one year of
project application); in 1984 under the Goggin Bill, AB 2583, Stats. 1984, ch. 1514, p.
5338 (streamlining CEQA by reducing "frivolous litigation," i.e., requiring pre-trial set-
tlement conferences and exhaustion of administrative remedies); and again in 1989 under
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changes occurred in 1972 when the legislature codified the main
holding of a then recent California Supreme Court decision mandat-
ing that CEQA guidelines apply to private projects subject to gov-
ernment approval. a Prior to this amendment to CEQA, the
guidelines had been interpreted very narrowly to apply to govern-
ment funded projects only.29 Under the amended guidelines, CEQA
applied to most public and private projects.30 Currently, under
CEQA, a party who proposes any project that will have a significant
effect 3 on the environment is subject to the requirements set forth
under the CEQA guidelines. The guideline requirements include in-
forming the public and government officials of the environmental im-
pact of the project3 2 as well as developing mitigation measures or
alternatives to reduce the impact of the project.3
The project approval process is detailed and complex. Set forth
the Cortese Bill, AB 3180, Stats. 1988, ch. 1232, p. 4107 (adding mitigation monitoring
and reporting requirements). In additition to the major ammendments noted above,
CEQA has undergone minor revisions almost annually. 1 CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND LAND USE PRACTICE §§ 20.03(2)(a)-(e) (Mark H. Wasserman ed. 1991); see
also Daniel P. Selmi, The Judicidal Development of the California Environmental
Quality Act, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 197 (1984).
28. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049,
104 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1972). See infra text accompanying notes 60-62.
29. Before Friends of Mammoth, many agencies considered CEQAs scope to be
very narrow and routinely failed to prepare required EIRs. See e.g., Friends of Lake
Arrowhead v. Board of Supervisors, 38 Cal. App. 3d 497, 113 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1974).
30. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(d) (West 1986); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14,
§ 15378 (1991). See, e.g., Mountain Lion Coalition v. California Fish and Game
Comm'n, 214 Cal. App. 3d 1043, 263 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1989)(proposed mountain lion
hunt required environmental impact analysis under CEQA); City of Santa Ana v. City of
Garden Grove, 100 Cal. App. 3d 521, 160 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1979)(amendment of city
general plan was considered "project" under CEQA.)
31. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21068 (West 1986); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15382
(1991). A significant effect on the environment has been defined as "a substantial, or
potentially substantial, adverse change in any of the physical conditions within the area
affected by the project including land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, ambient noise,
and objects of historic or aesthetic significance." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15382
(1991). However, economic or social changes alone are not considered significant envi-
ronmental effects. Id.
32. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15002(d) (1991). CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21065
(West 1986) defines a "project" as:
(a) Activities directly undertaken 'by any public agency. (b) Activities under-
taken by a person which are supported in whole or in part through contracts,
grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of assistance from one or more public
agencies. (c) Activities involving the issuance to a person of a lease, permit,
license, certificate, or other entitlement for use by one or more public agencies.
33. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15002(a)(2)-(3) (1991); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 21002 (West 1986). Under CEQA the lead agency has the duty to avoid or minimize
environmental damage when feasible through the adoption of mitigation measures or pro-
ject alternatives. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15021 (1991).
below is a brief overview. First, a local or state agency must deter-
mine whether the project falls under CEQA. In general, CEQA ap-
plies only to discretionary projects proposed to be carried out or
approved by a public agency.34 If the project is subject to CEQA,
the "lead agency" 5 prepares an Initial Study to determine if the
project will have a significant impact on the environment.3 8 An Ini-
tial Study is a preliminary analysis of the project's environmental
effects that aids the lead agency in determining what type of envi-
ronmental reporting is required.37 If the agency determines that
there is no significant impact on the environment from the project, a
Negative Declaration 38 is prepared. The Negative Declaration is a
document that states why the project will have no significant impact
34. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(a) (West 1986). Additionally, CEQA applies to
the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances, the issuance of zoning variances,
the issuance of conditional use permits, and the approval of tentative subdivision maps.
Id. However, there are a number of statutory exemptions from CEQA as well. Some
important exemptions are: ministerial projects, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080(b)(1)
(West 1986); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15268 (1991), emergency activities, such as
repairs to public facilities, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21080(b)(2)-(4) (West 1986); CAL,
REGS. CODE tit. 14, §§ 15269(a)-(c) (1991), projects that a public agency rejects or
disapproves (this provides the agency ability to quickly screen and disapprove projects
before initiation of CEQA process), CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080(b)(5) (West 1986);
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15270(a),(b) (1991). There are eleven other statutory ex-
emptions with an additional series of site-specific exemptions provided for in CEQA.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21080(b)(6)-(16), 21080.03, 21080.07 (West 1986).
35. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21067 (West 1986); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15367
(1991). A lead agency is the agency that has the principal responsibility for approving or
carrying out a project. Id. Under CEQA other agencies beside the lead agency are in-
volved in the environmental review process. A "responsible agency" (as opposed to the
lead agency) is an agency that will undertake or approve a specific project, but is not the
lead agency for the project. The term "responsible agency" includes all public agencies
other than the lead agency that have approval power over the project. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 21069 (West 1986); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15381 (1991). While a lead
agency must consider both the individual and collective effects of all activities involved in
a project, a "responsible agency" need only consider the effects of those activities in-
volved- in the project that it must carry out or approve. Additionally, the responsible
agency, when requested, must consult with the lead agency to assist in preparing the
environmental documents. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15096(a),(d) (1991). The respon-
sible agency's role in the environmental review process is outlined in CAL. CODE R Gs.
tit. 14, § 15096.
36. A lead agency can choose to prepare a full EIR without first preparing an
Initial Study if the lead agency determines that an EIR will clearly be required. CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15060(c), 15063(a) (1991).
37. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15063(a)-(g), 15365 (1991). The Initial Study has
a number of specific purposes. Some of the most important purposes include: (a) provid-
ing the lead agency with information to determine whether an EIR or negative declara-
tion should be prepared, (b) enabling a project applicant to modify a project before the
preparation of an EIR, (c) assisting the preparation of an EIR by focusing the analysis
on significant effects, (d) facilitating early environmental assessment during project de-
sign, (e) providing the factual basis for the negative declaration, and (f) eliminating
unnecessary EIRs. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15063(c)(1)-(6) (1991).
38. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21080(c), 21083, 21087. The content requirements
for Negative Declarations are outlined in CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15071 (1991).
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and, therefore, why no EIR is required. 9 If the Initial Study reveals
the project will have a significant environmental impact, then an
EIR must be prepared.4"
An EIR is a document that informs the public and government
officials of a project's adverse environmental impact. The EIR is de-
scribed as the "heart of CEQA."41 Additionally, California courts
state that the preparation of an EIR is the key to environmental
protection under CEQA.42
The EIR is prepared by or in conjunction with the lead agency.4 3
Although the format of an EIR is left to the discretion of the lead
agency, generally an EIR will contain: (1) A table of contents, (2) a
brief summary of the proposed actions, (3) a project description, (4)
the environmental setting of the project, (5) the environmental im-
pacts of the project, (6) a brief statement of non-significant impacts,
(7) organizations and persons consulted during the EIR preparation,
39. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21064 (West 1986). CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15070
(1991) provides:
A proposed negative declaration shall be prepared for a project subject to
CEQA when either:
(a) The initial study shows that there is no substantial evidence that the
project may have a significant effect on the environment, or
(b) The initial study identified potentially significant effects but:
(1) Revisions in the project plans or proposals made by or agreed to by
the applicant before the proposed negative declaration is released for pub-
lic review would avoid the effects or mitigate the effects to a point where
clearly no significant effects would occur, and
(2) There is no substantial evidence before the agency that the project
as revised may have a significant effect on the environment.
40. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21100, 21150 (West 1986).
41. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15003(a) (1991) (quoted in Citizens of Goleta
Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Cal. 3d 553, 564, 801 P.2d 1161, 1167, 276 Cal. Rptr.
410, 416 (1990)).
42. No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 75, 529 P.2d 66, 70, 118
Cal. Rptr 34, 38 (1974). See also Ronald E. Bass & Albert I. Herson, Environmental
Impact Reports, in 1 CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LAND USE PRACTICE
§ 22.01(2) (Mark H. Wasserman ed. 1991).
43. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21082.1 (West 1986); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14,
§ 15084 (1991). The lead agency must prepare the Final EIR. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14,
§ 15089(a) (1991). However, the Draft EIR may be prepared directly or under contract
by lead agencies. Acceptable arrangements for the preparation of Draft EIRs include:
(a) the lead agency preparing the EIR directly with their own staff, (b) contracting with
another public or private entity, (c) accepting a draft prepared by the project applicant
or his consultant, (d) entering into an agreement with project applicant to hire indepen-
dent contractor to prepare the EIR, and (e) using a previously prepared EIR. CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15084(d)(1)-(5) (1991). A recent appellate court decision has stated
that a Final EIR may be prepared by the project applicant if the lead agency reviews the
report's contents. Friends of La Vina v. County of Los Angeles, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1446,
284 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1991).
and (8) cumulative impacts of the project if significant."
In preparing the EIR, the lead agency consults with other respon-
sible agencies in order to receive input from them." Lead agencies
are also encouraged to participate in a process called "scoping." ' 4"
During scoping, the lead agency contacts potentially affected or in-
terested parties and asks what their concerns may be with respect to
the proposed project. In this manner, the EIR analysis can focus on
the effects that concern interested parties and eliminate unimportant
issues from the study.47
Once the Initial or Draft EIR is complete, a Notice of Completion
is filed with the Office of Planning and Research. 4" This notice is
also given to all organizations and individuals who have previously
requested notice and contiguous land owners if applicable. 49 The
Draft EIR is then available for public review and comment.
The lead agency is required to respond in writing to all comments
on environmental issues it receives.50 The public or any public agen-
cies may comment on the environmental impact of a project at any
44. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15120-32 (1991)(content requirements for EIRs).
45. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15096 (1991) (description of "responsible
agency's" role and requirements to assist lead agency in preparing Initial Report and
other environmental documents). See supra note 35.
46. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15083 (1991). "Scoping" is only an optional proce-
dure. Early consultation with the public is authorized and encouraged by the CEQA
guidelines but not required. However, scoping is required when a joint EIR/EIS (an EIS
is the federal equivalent of an EIR) is prepared in conjunction with the federal
government.
47. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15083 (1991) (description of the scoping process).
To support and encourage agencies to participate in scoping (which is not mandatory
under the CEQA guidelines), "[m]any public agencies have found early consultation
solves many potential problems that would arise in more serious forms later in the review
process." Id.
48. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15023, 15085(a)-(b) (1991). The Office of Plan-
ning and Research (OPR) is involved in the environmental review process in many ways.
The OPR reviews CEQA guidelines and makes recommendations for amendments to the
Secretary for Resources, distributes copies of environmental documents to various state
agencies and boards, ensures state responsible agencies provide information to lead agen-
cies in response to Notices of Preparation, resolves disputes as to which agency is the
lead agency for a project, and receives and files all Notices of Completion, Determina-
tion, and Exemption.
49. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15087(a); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21092, 21161(West 1986). The notice must specify the public review period, identify public meetings
or hearings on the proposed project (if any), describe the project and its location, and
disclose where the Draft EIR is available for review. An action may be invalidated if
there is not substantial compliance with the public notice requirements. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 21092(a) (West 1986) (amended 1989). The notice must be posted for 30 days
in the office of the county clerk where the project is located. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE.§ 21092.3 (West Supp. 1991).
50. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15088(a) (1991). The guidelines also allow the lead
agency to respond to late comments it receives after the official comment period. The
agency response must also include detailed reasons why specific comments and sugges-
tions were not accepted. In addition, the agency's response must include a good faith,
reasoned analysis. Conclusory statements unsupported by factual information will not
fulfill this requirement.
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time during the EIR process. 51 In fact, under the legislature's policy
statement, which was previously noted, the public is responsible for
participating in the process.52 During the comment period, public
hearings on the draft report, although not mandatory, are also en-
couraged a.5  After the lead agency responds to all the public com-
ments, the lead agency finalizes and certifies the EIR.54 The project
is then ready for approval.
Before approving a project, the lead agency must find that either
(1) the project's significant environmental effects identified in the
EIR have been avoided or mitigated or (2) social, economic, or other
conditions make mitigation measures or alternatives infeasible. Addi-
tionally, the lead agency must find that unmitigated environmental
effects are outweighed by the project's overall benefits. 55 The lead
agency should not approve a project as proposed if feasible alterna-
tives or mitigation measures are available that would substantially
lessen the project's significant environmental impact.5 6 If the project
is approved, the changes or alterations incorporated into the project
as mitigation measures or the overriding considerations that preclude
mitigation must be stated in the record.5 7 After approval, the lead
agency will file a Notice of Determination. 8 As soon as the notice is
51. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21003.1(a) (West 1986) ("comments from the public
and public agencies on the environmental effects of a project shall be made to lead agen-
cies as soon as possible").
52. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(e) (West 1986)(emphasis added) ("Every citi-
zen has a responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environ-
ment."). See also Daniel P. Selmi, The Judicial Development of the California
Environmental Quality Act, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 197 (1984).
53. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15087(g) (1991). "Public hearings may be con-
ducted on the environmental documents, either in separate proceedings or in conjunction
with other proceedings of the public agency. Public hearings are encouraged but not
required as an element of the CEQA process." Id.
54. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15090 (1991). The lead agency certifies that the
EIR has been completed according to CEQA and that the EIR was in fact presented,
reviewed, and considered prior to project approval.
55. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21002.1, 21081 (West 1986); CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
14, § 15091-93 (1991) (requirements of findings before project approval).
56. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 1986). This division (§§ 21000-177) is
intended to assist public agencies in "systematically identifying both the significant ef-
fects of proposed projects and the feasible alternatives or feasible mitigation measures."
Id.
57. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15093(b), (c) (1991).
58. CAL. CODE RaGS. tit. 14, § 15094(a) (1991). The Notice of Determination
includes an identification of the project, a brief description of the project, approval date,
whether the project will have significant environmental effects, whether mitigation mea-
sures were a condition of the approval, a statement that the EIR was prepared and certi-
fied to CEQA, whether a statement of overriding considerations was adopted, and where
a copy of the Final EIR may be examined.
posted with the county clerk, a thirty-day statute of limitations for
court challenges to approved projects begins to run.59
II. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT REQUIREMENTS AS
INTERPRETED BY THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: COURTS
INTERPRETING CEQA BROADLY
Since CEQA's inception, California courts have continued to rede-
fine and set the parameters for what is minimally required in an
EIR. Section II discusses four representative CEQA decisions. These
four decisions highlight how California courts have broadly inter-
preted the legislative intent and meaning of the CEQA guidelines.
The first issue the California Supreme Court broadly defined was
what constitutes a "project" under CEQA. In Friends of Mammoth
v. Board of Supervisors6" the California Supreme Court set the tone
for future interpretations of CEQA. Friends of Mammoth involved
whether CEQA guidelines applied when a public agency approved a
private development by issuing a conditional use permit. The court
held that CEQA compliance and environmental analysis were re-
quired when an agency issues permits and leases to private individu-
als; therefore, CEQA compliance was not limited to government
funded projects. 61 With Friends of Mammoth, the tone for CEQA
interpretation had been set for the courts to interpret CEQA to af-
ford the "fullest possible"62 protection for the environment.
Two years later, in No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles,63 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court defined what a "significant environmental ef-
fect"6 4 was under CEQA. The No Oil decision involved a proposed
zoning ordinance which would allow exploratory drilling for oil in
59. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 21167(b),(c),(e) (West 1986); CAL, CODE REGS, tit.
14, §§ 15075(e), 15094(d), 15112(c)(1) (1991) ("The filing of the notice of determina-
tion and the posting on a list of such notices starts a 30-day statute of limitations on
court challenges to the approval under CEQA."). CAL. CODE REas. tit. 14, § 15094(d)
(1991).
60. 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972).
61. Friends of Mammoth, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761
(1972). The court also approved language used by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in a case concerning the National Environmental
Policy Act. The court stated that the "judicial role is active" in CEQA cases. Id. at 261,
502 P.2d at 1058, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 770 (citing Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm. v.
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971)).
62. Friends of Mammoth, 8 Cal. 3d at 259, 502 P.2d at 1056, 104 Cal. Rptr. at
768 (1972).
63. 13 Cal. 3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1974).
64. CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE § 21068 (West 1986). Under CEQA and the CEQA
guidelines, projects which are deemed to have no significant environmental effect are not
required to complete an EIR and may only complete a Negative Declaration. CAL. CoDE
REGS. tit. 14, § 15064(g)(2) (1991).
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the Los Angeles area.65 The No Oil court, citing Friends of Mam-
moth, stated that an interpretation of CEQA with a "low threshold"
requirement for preparing an EIR would provide the most environ-
mental protection. 66 The court further stated that EIRs should be
prepared whenever an agency perceives some substantial evidence
that the project "may" have a significant impact on the environ-
ment 7 or whenever the project "arguably" will have an adverse im-
pact on the environment.6 8 By requiring environmental analysis for
projects with mere "arguable" effects, the California Supreme Court
again interpreted the CEQA guidelines to afford the maximum envi-
ronmental protection possible under CEQA.
California courts continued to interpret CEQA broadly. In San
Franciscans for Reasonable Growth v. City and County of San
Francisco,69 the appellate court articulated a requirement that the
public agency reviewing the project conduct an analysis of the cumu-
lative effects of the proposed project, as well as other proposed
projects in the affected area. The decision involved the proposed de-
velopment of a series of high-rise office buildings in downtown San
Francisco. The EIR for the project did not address the cumulative
impacts of other future downtown buildings that were also under re-
view at the time.10 The court held that a project's EIR must not only
carefully evaluate the direct impact of the project itself, but that the
EIR must also consider the cumulative impact of other "sibling"
projects under review.71 Again, California courts gave the EIR re-
quirements an expansive interpretation in order to ensure that the
maximum amount 'of important environmental information was
disclosed.
65. No Oil, Inc., 13 Cal.3d 68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1974).
66. Id. at 84, 529 P.2d at 76, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
67. Id. at 85, 529 P.2d at 77, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (quoting County of Inyo v.
Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 809, 108 Cal. Rptr. 377, 387 (1973)).
68. Id. at 85, 529 P.2d at 77, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (quoting Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 201 (D.D.C. 1972),
rev'd, 412 U.S. 669 (1973)). Many of the first interpretations of CEQA by California
courts relied heavily on National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) precedents for sup-
port. CEQA was initially modeled after NEPA and courts continue to use federal NEPA
case law in their decisions.
69. 151 Cal. App. 3d 61, 198 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1984).
70. Id. See also Citizens to Preserve the Ojai v. County of Ventura, 176 Cal. App.
3d 421, 222 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1985) (construing cumulative impact requirements under
CEQA).
71. San Franciscans for Reasonable Growth, 151 Cal. App. 3d at 75, 198 Cal.
Rptr. at 641. The court noted that without a mechanism for addressing the cumulative
effects of projects, there would be "piecemeal development" and "havoc" in the urban
environment. Id. at 76-77, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 642 (1984).
Finally, in Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dis-
trict Agricultural Ass'n,712 the California Supreme Court extended
by interpretation the statute of limitations to bring an action for
noncompliance with CEQA. Concerned Citizens involved a project to
build an amphitheater adjacent to a residential development. After
the amphitheater was completed, the local residents discovered it dif-
fered significantly from the project as described in the EIR.7 The
CEQA guidelines mandated a 180-day statute of limitations begin-
ning with the "commencement" of the project.74
In order to circumvent this strict requirement, the court held that
when projects deviate from their EIRs, the "commencement" of the
project will not begin until the plaintiff "knew or reasonably should
have known" the project differed from the EIR.75 The court rea-
soned that the project that was built was not the same "project" as
in the EIR and, therefore, the statute of limitations did not apply.76
In support of its decision, the California Supreme Court emphasized
the same policy considerations it had stressed in the cases previously
discussed. CEQA was interpreted broadly for the benefit of the
environment.
A common thread runs through these cases interpreting CEQA
guidelines. The courts suggested they would not shrink from broadly
interpreting CEQA in order to ensure that environmental conse-
quences are given their own separate consideration in the decision
making process.
Until recently, the environmentally expansive trend appeared
likely to continue. In a series of cases defining the scope and depth
that alternative sites should be afforded in EIRs, the courts contin-
ued to interpret CEQA broadly. Not until the recent supreme court
decision of Goleta did the courts begin to backtrack from the goal of
72. 42 Cal. 3d 929, 727 P.2d 1029, 231 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1986).
73. Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd District Agric. Ass'n, 42 Cal.
3d 929, 727 P.2d 1029, 231 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1986). Contrary to the EIR, the amphithea-
ter was significantly larger, the stage directly faced the residential area, noise mitigation
measures were not followed, and the noise levels exceeded county laws. The amphitheater
proposed in the Project EIR had called for a 5,000 seat capacity, while the amphitheater
as-built had a seating capacity of over 7,000 seats. Id. at 933-34, 727 P.2d at 1031-32,
231 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
74. CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE § 21167(a) (West 1986). Actions filed against agencies
which proceed with projects without filing an EIR when one is required by CEQA (under§ 21166(a)) must be filed within 180 days after the commencement of the project.
75. Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc., 42 Cal. 3d at 939, 727 P.2d at 1035,
231 Cal. Rptr. at 754.
76. Id. The court, citing Friends of Mammoth, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104
Cal. Rptr. 751 (1972), stated that allowing this interpretation of the statute of limita-
tions under CEQA was "consistent with the Legislature's intent that CEQA 'be inter-
preted in such a manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment.'"
Id. The court also elaborated upon the overriding goal of encouraging public participa-
tion in the environmental review process. Id.
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"affording the fullest protection" to the environment. Section III is
an overview of those earlier expansive cases that initially defined al-
ternative site analysis under CEQA.
III. ALTERNATIVE SITE ANALYSIS:
THE EXPANSIVE YEARS AND
THE "RULE OF REASON"
The CEQA guidelines expressly mandate that alternatives and
mitigation measures be discussed in EIRs.77 However, California
courts were left to interpret the quantity, quality, and scope of alter-
native analysis required under CEQA. Section III traces a series of
six cases that outlined and defined the parameters of alternative
analysis under CEQA. The last case discussed in section III, the
Laurel Heights decision, reaffirmed the courts' commitment to
broadly interpret CEQA guidelines for the benefit of the
environment.
A. Selected Case Law Defining Alternative Analysis
Under CEQA
In Residents Ad Hoc Stadium Comm'n v. Board of Trustees,7" a
California appellate court articulated some early guidelines for the
scope of alternatives analysis. Residents involved a football stadium
to be built in conjunction with the California State University cam-
pus in Fresno. 9 The EIR discussed four potential alternatives, in-
cluding two different site locations and the "no-project" ' 0 option.81
The EIR also specifically provided the reasons why the alternatives
were not chosen . 2 The court stated that the discussion of alterna-
tives must be "sufficient to permit a reasonable choice of alternatives
77. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15126(c)-(d) (1991). See supra text accompany-
ing note 33.
78. 89 Cal. App. 3d 274, 152 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975).
79. Resident's Ad Hoc Stadium Comm'n v. Board of Trustees, 89 Cal. App. 3d
274, 152 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1975). At the time the land for the project site was purchased
by the University, it was largely surrounded by open agricultural land. Later, when the
stadium project was proposed, the project site was surrounded by single family homes
and apartments. Id.
80. Referred to as the "no-project alternative." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14,
§ 15126(d)(2) (1991) ("The specific alternative of 'no project' shall also be evaluated
along with the impact.").
81. Resident's Ad Hoc Stadium Comm'n, 89 Cal. App. 3d at 288, 152 Cal. Rptr.
at 594.
82. Id. at 288, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 594-95. The trustees had delayed their decision on
so far as environmental aspects are concerned. 8 3 The court in dicta
stated that it was not appropriate to disregard alternatives simply
because they may require implementing legislation or are beyond the
scope of expertise of the agency. 8' Although the court held that the
discussion of alternatives was adequate in this particular case, the
court's statements provided future ammunition for citizens' groups
seeking to attack EIRs on the basis of content sufficiency.
1. Introduction of the "'Rule of Reason"
The next case that focused on project alternative analysis was
Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage v. City and
County of San Francisco.85 In this decision, the court articulated the
"rule of reason" principle. The decision involved the proposed demo-
lition of a historic building in downtown San Francisco. A citizens'
group attacked the sufficiency of the EIR on the basis that it failed
to adequately discuss the alternatives to demolition.8
The court held that the discussion of alternatives was adequate
under CEQA. It noted that the EIR included thirty-nine pages of
detailed discussion on the two no-demolition alternatives the citizens
group had proposed and the "no-project" alternative.8s The court
stated:
The statutory requirements for consideration of alternatives must be
judged against a rule of reason. There is no need for the EIR to consider an
alternative whose effect cannot be reasonably ascertained and whose imple-
mentation is deemed remote and speculative. 8
The court cited a federal National Environmental Policy Act case
the stadium until two public hearings were held. The second hearing was held after inter-
ested parties had been given an opportunity to state their objections to the EIR. Id. at
285, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
83. Id. at 287, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
84. Id. at 286, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 593. The court went on to provide that consider-
ing implementing legislation in alternatives was allowable because "CEQA was intended
to provide a basis for consideration and choice by all branches of government," Id. at
286-87, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
85. 106 Cal. App. 3d 893, 165 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1980).
86. Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage v. City and County of
San Francisco, 106 Cal. App. 3d 893, 165 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1980). The Foundation com-
plained that the two citizens' group alternatives discussed in the EIR were misrepre-
sented and that the potential sale of the building to another developer was not explored.
Id. at 909, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
87. Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage, 106 Cal. App. 3d at
909, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 410. The alternatives of renovation that the citizens' group had
suggested were not adopted because the existing building renovated in any manner would
not have met the needs of the developer's marketing requirements, the building might not
have met seismic safety standards, and the renovation would have entailed substantial
additional cost and delay to the developer. Id. at 904, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
88. Id. at 910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 410 (emphasis added).
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to support this new rule of reason standard.89 The court noted "abso-
lute perfection" was not required in EIRs90 CEQA only required
officials and agencies to make an objective "good faith" effort to
comply.9 Citizens' groups would have to be more careful in attack-
ing EIRs for failing to discuss alternatives. Groups would have to
argue they were not requiring "perfection," but were finding genuine
deficiencies in the documents.
The "rule of reason" was codified under title 14 of the California
Code of Regulations section 15126(d)(5). The code reiterated the
"rule of reason" and also stated that "[t]he key issue is whether the
selection and discussion of alternatives fosters informed decisionmak-
ing and informed public participation.""2
The California courts began to vigorously apply the rule of reason
in interpreting the sufficiency of project EIRs. In Village Laguna of
Laguna Beach, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors,9 3 the appellate court
held that an EIR which did not discuss the "literally thousands of
'reasonable alternatives'" was still sufficient under CEQA.94 The de-
cision involved a proposed single-family home development on 1,310
acres in Orange County.95 The EIR discussed four project alterna-
tives.96 The first alternative was "no development" and would allow
the property to remain as a cattle ranch. 7 The second, third, and
fourth alternatives permitted 7,500 homes (the "low density" alter-
native), 10,000 homes, and 25,000 homes (the "high density" alter-
native) respectively. 8 The citizens' group attacked the EIR on the
basis that "some number" between 10,000 and 20,000 needed to be
discussed in the EIR 99
89. Id. See Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub
nom. Sierra Club v. Hills, 421 U.S. 994 (1975), and sub nom. Edward Underground
Water Dist. v. Hills, 442 U.S. 1049 (1975).
90. Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage, 106 Cal. App. 3d at
910, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 410.
91. Foundation for San Francisco's Architectural Heritage, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 910,
165 Cal. Rptr. at 410-11. "Absolute perfection is not required; what is required is the
production of information sufficient to permit a reasonable choice of alternatives so far as
environmental aspects are concerned. It is only required that the officials and agencies
make an objective, good faith effort to comply." Id.
92. CAL. CODE REGs. tit. 14, § 15126(d)(5) (1991) (emphasis added).
93., 134 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 185 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1982).
94. Village Laguna, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 1028, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 44-45.
95. Id. at 1028, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
96. Id.
97. Village Laguna, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 1028, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
98. Id.
99. Id. The citizens' group chose the 10,000 unit figure based on what the prior
land-use element had allowed. The second 20,000 unit figure was the number proposed
Although the court acknowledged that an alternative number of
units between 10,000 and 20,000 was a "reasonable" alternative, it
would not brand the EIR as inadequate under CEQA. The court
stated that it was not unreasonable for the decision makers and the
public to extrapolate the environmental advantages of a project in
the undiscussed middle range by comparing the impacts of the
higher and lower figures.1"0 The court again cited federal National
Environmental Policy Act precedent to support the theory of not ex-
ploring "every conceivable variation" of reasonable alternatives in
EIRs.10 ' The court, citing Foundation for San Francisco's Architec-
tural Heritage, reaffirmed the rule of reason and stated that suffi-
cient information had been provided to make a reasonable choice.102
As additional courts addressed the issue of alternative site analysis
in EIRs, they delineated the parameters of sufficient analysis under
CEQA. A reasonable range of alternatives should be discussed in an
EIR. Although courts often asserted that EIRs were not required to
be "perfect," courts often continued to find EIRs inadequate for fail-
ing to discuss alternatives in sufficient detail.
In San Bernadino Valley Audubon Society, Inc. v. County of
Santa Barbara,°3 the court held that the EIR was inadequate for
failing to fully discuss off-site alternatives and a potential land trade
with the Forest Service. The decision involved a proposal to develop
a cemetery on land supporting rare plants and bald eagle habitat.
Although the EIR did have a section entitled "alternatives," no spe-
cific alternative sites were discussed.1 04 The EIR merely stated that
relocating the project at other locations in the area "may" result in
similar environmental damage; for another location to be more ad-
vantageous, it would need the same general attributes, but not the
rare plants. The EIR also briefly mentioned that the Forest Service
proposed a property trade with the project owner for less environ-
mentaly sensitive land but did not provide further detail.' 05 The
by the homebuilder. Id.
100. Id. at 1029, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 45. ("It [was] not then unreasonable to con-
clude that an alternative not discussed in the EIR could be intelligently considered by
studying the adequate descriptions of the plans that are discussed.")
101. Id. (quoting Brooks v. Coleman, 518 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1975)). The court also
noted that CEQA was modeled on NEPA and that judicial interpretaion of NEPA is
persuasive authority for CEQA decisions (citing Wildlife Alive v. Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d
190, 553 P.2d 537, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1976)). Id. at 1028, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 44 n.3.
102. Id. at 1029, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 45. In support of the rule of reason, the court
also cited two federal NEPA cases: Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC,
435 U.S. 519 (1978); Coalition for Canyon Preservation v. Bowers, 632 F.2d 774 (9th
Cir. 1980).
103. 155 Cal. App. 3d 738, 202 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1984).
104. Id. The EIR contained the required "no-project" alternative and alternative
land usage, but no off-site alternatives were mentioned. Id. at 751, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
105. Id. at 751, 202 Cal. Rptr. 428-29. The EIR did not discuss whether there
were actually other sites within the Big Bear area which would have been suitable for the
[VOL, 29: 123. 1992] The Cal. Envtl. Quality Act
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
court was unwilling to accept this cursory analysis of project alterna-
tives and stated the EIR failed to provide sufficient information to
allow decision makers to "intelligently take account of environmental
consequences." 106 Again, courts willingly drew the line and disal-
lowed EIRs that did not sufficiently detail project on-site and off-site
alternatives.107
2. Alternatives Must Actually Be Considered in the
Decision Making Process
California courts became more demanding regarding the amount
of actual consideration given to alternatives in the decision making
process. It was not enough to merely describe an adequate number of
alternatives in an EIR. If a decision maker was going to approve a
project despite the environmental consequences, the reasons why the
alternatives were not chosen should be included in the Statement of
Overriding Considerations.0 8
In Citizens for Quality Growth v. City of Mt. Shasta,109 the court
held that even though the EIR discussed six potential alternatives,
the city had failed to adequately consider them in its decision. The
decision involved a proposal to re-zone a thirty-five acre tract con-
sisting of wetlands to commercial and controlled manufacturing uses.
The EIR listed thirty-five mitigation measures and six project alter-
natives."10 The city determined the mitigation measures were infeasi-
ble, approved the proje6t, and drafted a Statement of Overriding
proposed project. Regarding the potential land trade with the Forest Service, the EIR did
not mention the location, attributes, or why the Forest Service property would not be a
feasible alternative. Id. at 751, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
106. Id. at 751, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 428 (citing Santiago County Water Dist. v.
County of Orange, 118 Cal. App. 3d 818, 173 Cal. Rptr. 602 (1981)).
107. On-site alternatives consist of project alternatives at the same location. Off-
site alternatives are those which consider actual project location changes. See, e.g., Citi-
zens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Cal. 3d 553, 801 P.2d, 276 Cal. Rptr.
410 (1990).
108. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15093 (1991). A Statement of Overriding Consid-
erations is a document which explains why the benefits of a proposed project outweigh
the unavoidable adverse environmental effects and thus are deemed "acceptable." Addi-
tionally, if the project is approved with unmitigable impacts, "the agency shall state in
writing the specific reasons to support its action based on the final EIR." Id. (emphasis
added).
109. 198 Cal. App. 3d 433, 243 Cal. Rptr. 727 (1988).
110. Citizens for Quality Growth v. City of Mt. Shasta, 198 Cal. App. 3d 433,
444, 243 Cal. Rptr. 727, 733 (1988). The six project alternatives were (1) no project, (2)
development of non-wetland area only, (3) residential use, (4) alternate project design,
(5) periodic land use inventory review and promotion of infill, and (6) option design.
Alternatives (1) and (2) were identified as "environmentally superior alternatives."
Considerations.111 The court stated that both mitigation measures
and project alternatives must be found to be infeasible before a pro-
ject with adverse environmental effects may be approved.1 12 Since
the statement failed to mention the six project alternatives, the court
determined the alternatives had not actually been considered in the
decision to approve the project.'l In support of its holding in this
case, the court again reiterated the common expansive theme that
CEQA should be interpreted to afford the "fullest" protection to the
environment.11 4
B. The California Supreme Court on Alternative Site Analysis:
The Expansive Laurel Heights Decision
After a long series of appellate court cases, the California Su-
preme Court finally addressed the issue of CEQA alternative site
analysis. The supreme court in Laurel Heights Improvement Associ-
ation v. Regents of University of California 5 adopted a broad
stance regarding the sufficiency of project alternatives in EIRs.
Laurel Heights involved the planned relocation of a University of
California bio-medical research facility to a residential neighbor-
hood. The EIR had identified three types of alternatives: no project,
alternative sites on the UCSF campus, and alternative sites off-cam-
pus. Only one and one-half pages of a 250 page EIR were devoted to
the discussion of alternatives. The EIR flatly stated that no on-cam-
pus alternatives were evaluated as options. Regarding the off-campus
alternatives, the EIR merely provided a map of other university fa-
cilities (represented by dots) and simply stated that the other loca-
tions were not large enough to accommodate the proposed
facilities.1 16
11. Id. at 439, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 729. The EIR stated that the 21 environmental
impacts could be reduced to insignificance by implementing the mitigation measures. The
six proposed project alternatives included the no-project option as well as a non-wetland
only option. A soils engineer had been brought onto the project site and confirmed the
soils were "wetland."
112. Id. at 444, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
113. Id. The city had argued that since CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21081 stated that
an agency may approve a project if "[s]pecific economic, social, or other considerations
make infeasible the mitigation measures or project alternatives identified in the environ-
mental impact report," the city only had to address either mitigation measures or alter-
natives. Id. (emphasis added). The court disagreed with this narrow interpretation of the
guidelines.
114. Id. at 440, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 730 (quoting Friends of Mammoth v. Board of
Supervisors, 8 Cal. 3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761 (1972)). See supra text
accompanying notes 60-62,
115. 47 Cal. 3d 376, 764 P.2d 278, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988).
116. Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n, 47 Cal. 3d at 403, 764 P.2d at 290, 253
Cal. Rptr. at 438. The court criticized the analysis for lack of data and conclusory state-
ments regarding off-site alternatives stating, "It is impossible to analyze meaningfully the
reports conclusion that Laurel Heights is the only available facility of sufficient size." Id.
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The supreme court held that the EIR had not adequately dis-
cussed the project alternatives under CEQA. The supreme court
opinion openly criticized the University's analysis, stating that "[i]t
defies common sense for the Regents to characterize this as a discus-
sion of any kind; this is barely an identification of alternatives, if
even that."" 7
The supreme court discussed the legislative intent of CEQA and
reaffirmed the broad policy statement of providing the "fullest pro-
tection" to the environment." 8 The court also addressed the need to
keep the public informed and to encourage public participation in
the environmental review process. The court emphasized informed
public participation as the "key" to alternative site analysis. The
court stated that the public must be able to follow "the analytic
route" the agency traveled in the decision-making process and that it
was "critical" that the public be as "equally informed" as the
agency." 9 The court also reinforced the public's role by providing
that if alternatives are rejected by an agency, they must be discussed
in sufficient detail to "enable meaningful participation and criticism
by the public.' ' 20
Regarding the scope of alternatives in EIRs, the court again
echoed the expansive theme of earlier decisions. The court restated
that "all reasonable alternatives" must be thoroughly assessed.' 2'
117. Id. (emphasis in original).
118. Id. at 390, 764 P.2d at 281, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 429. The court acknowledged
that the broad view taken in Friends of Mammoth was the "foremost principle" that the
legislature intended under CEQA.
119. Id. at 404, 764 P.2d at 291, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 439. The court stated that
"[w]ithout meaningful analysis of alternatives in the EIR, neither the courts nor the
public can fulfill their proper roles in the CEQA process." The court also noted that
whatever was considered to approve the project should be in the EIR itself; what various
government officials knew themselves from other sources cannot make up for shortfalls in
the EIR. Id.
120. Id. at 405, 764 P.2d at 291, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 439 (emphasis added). Al-
though the court emphasized the importance of public participation in the environmental
review process, they were not willing to shift the burden of identifying alternatives away
from project proponents. The court flatly dismissed the Regents' argument that alterna-
tives need only be discussed if project opponents can suggest feasible alternatives. The
court stated that the burden to discuss project alternatives is on the project proponent
and that the legislature never intended for the proponent to merely respond to the alter-
natives suggested by the public. The court reasoned that the project proponent knows the
requirements and potential changes in the project and, therefore, would be the most logi-
cal party to suggest alternatives. Id.
121. Id. at 400, 764 P.2d at 288, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 436 (quoting Wildlife Alive v.
Chickering, 18 Cal. 3d 190, 553 P.2d 537, 132 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1976)). The court reaf-
firmed the holding of Citizens for Quality Growth, 198 Cal. App. 3d 433, 243 Cal. Rptr.
727 (1988), in that both mitigation measures and alternatives must be discussed. Both
With this strong wording and unequivocal support for a broad in-
terpretation of the guidelines, the Laurel Heights court provided a
solid framework for the interpretation of CEQA alternatives analy-
sis. The supreme court continued the trend where the appellate
courts had ended. Commentators heralded the unanimous decision as
a reaffirmation of "the tough standards" of CEQA and noted that
the decision should encourage people who look to CEQA for environ-
mental protection. 22
Two years later, the California Supreme Court again refined alter-
native site analysis under CEQA. On New Year's Eve 1990, the su-
preme court handed down its decision in Citizens of Goleta Valley v.
Board of Supervisors.'23 The Goleta decision focused upon "feasibil-
ity" as a threshold for the inclusion of an alternative in an EIR. This
"threshold of feasibility" would grant lead agencies and project de-
velopers the power to pre-screen and limit the range of alternatives
discussed in a project EIR.
IV. THE GOLETA DECISION: THE DOCTRINE OF "FEASIBILITY"
The Goleta case dealt squarely with how much discussion of alter-
natives is necessary in Environmental Impact Reports. In the early
1980s, the owner of a seventy-three acre ocean front parcel entered
into an agreement with the Hyatt Corporation to build a hotel-resort
on the site. The proposed hotel site was at the western end of the
Goleta Valley and was surrounded by urban and suburban develop-
ment. In order to accommodate the hotel, the Hyatt Corporation pe-
titioned the county to zone the property for visitor-serving
commercial development. 12 4 Prior to Hyatt's zoning request, land-use
experts defined the property as a "white hole" (an undesignated
piece of property).2 5 The land was unzoned due to the inability of
topics must be included in an EIR because an agency does not know until project ap-
proval which mitigation measures, if any, will be adopted. Therefore, a project proponent
cannot anticipate the certain adoption of mitigation measures and ignore the requirement
of discussing alternatives.
122. Pamela A. Maclean, California Regional News, Proprietary to the United
Press International (December 1, 1988) (quoting Antonio Cosby-Rossman, an attorney
specializing in environmental law and a visiting professor at UCLA). Cosby-Rossman
noted that the Laurel Heights decision was the first decision interpreting CEQA since a
conservative majority took control of the supreme court in March 1987. Id.
123. 52 Cal. 3d 553, 801 P.2d 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990).
124. Id. at 559, 801 P.2d at 1164, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 413. The project site was
known locally as Haskell's Beach. Although the property was vacant at the time, it had
been used in the past for oil processing. Even though the property had been developed in
the past, it did support a number of environmentally sensitive habitats and archeological
sites. Three Native American burial sites were located on the project site.
125. Id. In Santa Barbara County's Local Coastal Plan, Haskell's Beach had no
land use designation or development policy. The property was under the concurrent plan-
ning authority of the county and the Coastal Commission. The county had initially in-
tended to zone the property for planned residential development, however, the Coastal
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the county and the Coastal Commission to agree on the property's
use. Hyatt filed its first EIR and the property was zoned to accom-
modate the hotel-resort project.126 The EIR included four project al-
ternatives. The alternatives were (1) the prerequisite "no project"
alternative, (2) a high-density residential development, (3) a smaller
340-unit hotel, and (4) a 400-unit hotel with the option for a second
phase of additional units. The EIR did not discuss any alternative
sites for the development.' 27
A. The First and Second Appellate Court Decisions:
Alternatives Analysis Inadequate Under CEQA
A local citizens' group challenged the sufficiency of the EIR for
failing to discuss alternative locations. The appellate court agreed
and stated the failure to address any off-site alternatives rendered
the EIR inadequate under CEQA.'28 Hyatt then created and sub-
mitted a supplemental EIR. In the supplemental EIR, only one al-
ternative location was briefly discussed.129 The EIR found that all
Commission had refused to accept this designation. The Coastal Commission proposed
the property be zoned as resort/visitor serving commercial, but the county refused to
accept that designation.
126. Id. at 560, 801 P.2d at 1164, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 413. In 1983, Hyatt filed an
application for development of Haskell's Beach. As a result of Hyatt's application, the
property was rezoned from PRD (planned residential development) to CV (visitor serving
commercial). Hyatt's EIR was also certified as complete at the same time. Citizens of
Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1167, 1173, 243 Cal. Rptr. 339,
342 (1988), rev'd, 52 Cal. 3d 553, 801 P.2d 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990).
127. Citizens of Goleta Valley, 197 Cal. App. 3d at 1174, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 342-
43. Even though the 340-unit alternative would have provided greater flexibility to avoid
impacting sensitive biological and agricultural resources, this less-dense alternative was
not chosen due to economic infeasability. The EIR did not detail the relative mitigation
that could be achieved by adopting the 340-unit proposal as opposed to the 400-unit
proposal. Regarding an off-site alternative, the EIR merely stated that development of
alternative sites was not addressed because Hyatt did not own any other suitable proper-
ties for the project.
128. Id. at 1180, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 346. Hyatt had contended that since it owned
no other feasible site in the area it would be unreasonable for them to be required to
consider an off-site alternative in the EIR. The appellate court did not agree and stated,
"Serving the public purpose at minimal environmental expense is the goal of CEQA.
Ownership of the land used and identity of the developer are factors of lesser signifi-
cance." Id. (emphasis added). Hyatt's failure to consider any off-site alternatives ren-
dered the EIR inadequate under CEQA.
129. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 216 Cal. App. 3d 48, 264
Cal. Rptr. 587 (1989), rev'd, 52 Cal. 3d 553, 801 P.2d 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990).
The Supplemental EIR (SEIR) discussed one alternative site at Santa Barbara Shores.
The Santa Barbara Shores site was deemed to be preferable regarding biological and
cultural impact; however, the site would have more severe negative impact on traffic, air
quality, and water resources. The county rejected the Santa Barbara Shores location and
other alternative locations were "infeasible," "speculative," or "re-
mote." The only supporting evidence included brief references to two
Coastal Commission reports from 1980 and 1985, a 1980 Local
Coastal Plan, and some planning staff recommendations. No sepa-
rate in-depth analysis of other alternative locations appeared in the
EIR.130
Once again, the appellate court agreed with the citizens group and
held that the analysis of alternative sites was still inadequate under
CEQA. 131 The court relied heavily on the expansive language of the
Laurel Heights decision. The appellate court reaffirmed that one of
the primary purposes of an EIR was to inform the'public.13 2 The
court stated that references to other documents outside the EIR were
insufficient to provide the public with adequate notice of why appar-
ent alternative sites were rejected.133
The citizens' group had suggested all the "infeasible" alternatives
that were not analyzed in the EIR. The court noted that a lead
agency may not refuse to review sites "simply because those sites do
not meet all the proposed objectives [of the project] or because they
may present economic or environmental difficulties of their own. 134
Hyatt argued that the EIR need not discuss other alternatives be-
cause the other locations were (a) congested, (b) might sustain nega-
tive biological impacts, and (c) did not contain all the desirable
gave its final approval to Hyatt. Id.
130. Id. at 54, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
131. Id. The appellate court determined that the SEIR did not sufficiently discuss
facts to "adequately inform the public why ostensibly reasonable alternative sites ...
were rejected." Regarding the level of analysis, alternatives are given in an EIR the
court provided:
In those cases where consideration of alternative sites is warranted for a pro-
posed project, an EIR must contain: 1. a discussion concerning a range of rea-
sonable alternative sites, and 2. a brief discussion of why sites which are
apparently or ostensibly reasonable were rejected as infeasible, remote or spec-
ulative. The EIR need not discuss sites which are obviously infeasible, remote
or speculative.
Id.
132. Id. at 58, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 592. "The key issue is whether the selection and
discussion of alternatives fosters informed decisionmaking and informed public participa-
tion." Id. (quoting Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n, 47 Cal. 3d at 403-04, 764 P.2d at
290, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 438. See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15126(d)(5) (1991).
133. Goleta, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 56, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 591. The court rejected
Hyatt's argument that the administrative documents reviewed during the scoping process
were the "functional equivalent" to an EIR. The court stated that the two Coastal Com-
mission reports and Local Coastal Plan did not discuss the specific environmental effects
of this project. Although the commission reports were "extremely valuable," they "are
not the 'functionally equivalent' to an EIR and are not adequate substitutes for specific
study and analysis of the project." Id.
134. Id. at 62, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 594-95. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14,§ 15126(d)(3) (1990) (alternatives should be discussed in EIR "even if these alterna-
tives would impede to some degree the attainment of the project objectives, or would be
more costly"). CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15126(d)(3) (1990).
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attributes sought for the project. The court, citing the CEQA guide-
lines, stated that these criteria were not the proper basis for failing
to discuss an alternative. 3 5
B. The Supreme Court Decision: Alternatives Sufficient in EIR,
Concentration upon "Feasibility" as Determining Scope
The supreme court rejected the appellate court's finding that the
discussion of alternatives in the EIR was inadequate under
CEQA.3 6 The court focused upon "feasibility" as a basis for dis-
cussing alternative locations in EIRs. The supreme court cited Cali-
fornia Public Resources Code section 21002 for support and stated
that the nature and scope of alternatives discussed in EIRs was gov-
erned by "feasibility.' '13 7
The Goleta court acknowledged that the CEQA legislation had
not established a "categorical legal imperative" as to the scope of
alternatives to be discussed in an EIR. '3 The court stated that pro-
ject EIRs must consider a "reasonable range of alternatives" to the
project, or location of the project, which: (1) offer substantial envi-
ronmental advantages over the project proposal and (2) may be "fea-
sibly accomplished in a successful manner" considering the
economic, environmental, social, and technological factors. 139
135. Goleta, 216 Cal. App. 3d at 62, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 594 (citing CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 14, § 15126(d)(3) (1990)). "Even readily apparent economic, environmental,
technical or social trade-offs are insufficient to excuse the study and discussion of such
sites." Id.
136. Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 52 Cal. 3d 553, 801 P.2d
1161, 176 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990). The supreme court was not alone. Some commentators
also agreed that the appellate court had gone too far. One commentator described the
appellate decision as "impermissible judicial activism that ran afoul of the legislative
intent behind the California Environmental Quality Act." Sigfredo A. Cabrera, Weigh-
ing the Nay-saying; The State Supreme Court Rolls Up Its Sleeves to Strike a Balance
Between Growth and Environmentalism, THE RECORDER, January 31, 1991, at 4, col 2.
137. Goleta, 52 Cal. 3d at 565, 801 P.2d at 1167-68, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17.
In determining the nature and scope of alternatives to be examined in an EIR,
the Legislature has decreed that local agencies shall be guided by the doctrine
of "feasibility." "[I]t is the policy of the state that public agencies should not
approve projects as proposed if there are feasible alternatives or feasible miti-
gation measures available which would substantially lessen the significant envi-
ronmental effects of such projects .... "
Id. (quoting CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 1986)) (emphasis in original). How-
ever, according to the Laurel Heights decision, § 21002 does not define the content re-
quirements of EIRs but deals expressly with project approval. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d
at 401, 764 P.2d at 288, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
138. Goleta, 52 Cal. 3d at 565, 801 P.2d at 1168, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
139. Id. (citing CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 21061.1 (West 1986); CAL. CODE REGS.
tit. 14, § 15364 (1991)) (citation omitted).
Alternatives which the lead agency and project developers deemed
"infeasible" would not have to be discussed in detail in the project
EIR.1' ° The supreme court stated that the local agency could make
the initial determination about which alternatives are feasible and,
therefore, merit in-depth consideration, and which alternatives are
infeasible and do not.14 The Goleta court also held that when poten-
tial alternatives were not discussed in detail in the EIR because they
were not feasible, the evidence or reasons for infeasibility did not
have to appear in the EIR itself. Rather, the court allowed the evi-
dence to be in the administrative record. 42
The Goleta decision seemed to pull back from the expansive "full
public disclosure" or "equally informed" views of Laurel Heights.143
The lead agency and project developer would make the initial deter-
mination of what alternatives are "feasible" and discuss only those
alternatives in-depth in the EIR. All other potential alternatives that
the lead agency either did not consider or deemed "infeasible" may
be only briefly mentioned in the EIR (if at all) with their analysis (if
any) relegated to the administrative record. Although the screening
device of feasibility on its face seems acceptable, some potential
problems should be addressed.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE TO ALTERNATIVE SITE ANALYSIS
Three potential problems arise when lead agencies and project de-
velopers are allowed to discuss only those alternatives they initially
deem as feasible in their project EIRs. The three potential problems
140. Id. at 569, 801 P.2d at 1171, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 410. The Goleta court deter-
mined that projects located outside the jurisdiction of the lead agency and sites not
owned by the project proponent were generally not "feasible." Under the feasibility doc-
trine, these types of potentially environmentally superior alternatives would not need to
be thoroughly discussed in an EIR. In determining that these types of sites were infeasi-
ble, the court again relied upon the definition of feasibility in California Public Resources
Code § 21061.1. Id. at 574, 801 P.2d at 1174, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 423. As a result, in most
private projects, no off-site alternatives would ever be discussed in an EIR. Since private
property owners generally do not own other suitable pieces of property, project
deverlopers will merely state that all other potentially environmentally superior parcels
are "infeasible" due to their lack of ownership. The emphasis on initially screening "fea-
sible" alternatives will leave lead agencies and decision makers with "all" or "nothing"
decisions in private projects. All other unowned off-site alternatives will be deemed "in-
feasible" and the agency will have a choice between the "no project" alternative or the
on-site alternatives. When faced with losing the increased tax revenue a new project
brings, decision-makers will be more likely to choose the "all" over the "nothing."
141. Id. at 569, 801 P.2d at 1170, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 419 (citing Committee of Ky.
ex rel. Beshear v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 1981)).
142. Id. at 569, 801 P.2d at 1171, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 420. "'But where potential
alternatives are not discussed in detail in the [EIR] because they are not feasible, the
evidence of infeasibility need not be found within the [EIR] itself. Rather a court may
look to the administrative record as a whole . '..."' Id. (quoting Committee of Ky,, 655
F.2d at 719).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 115-22.
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are: (1) lead agencies and project developers will not diligently
search for environmentally superior alternatives,""' (2) feasibility is
subjective and the public will be cut off from the "analytic route" of
the decision making process,1 45 and (3) using "feasibility" to pre-
screen alternatives is not compatible with the statutory language of
CEQA and other recent court interpretations. 146
A. The Potential Problems
1. Failure to Diligently Seek Alternatives
The first problem is the general unwillingness of lead agencies and
project developers to search out alternatives dilligently. Project de-
velopers are inherently biased in favor of their own project ideas. 47
The project developer's goal is to see its own proposal approved, not
to seek out the best alternatives. 48 Generally the developer has an
incentive not to find the best alternative as it may mean the devel-
oper's project may be rejected."49
Commentators, surveys, and environmental analysts have acknowl-
edged that project developers are not extremely interested in pursu-
ing project alternatives. 150 Few developers are predisposed to believe
144. See infra text accompanying notes 147-54.
145. See infra text accompanying notes 155-63.
146. See infra text accompanying notes 164-72.
147. This general human tendency to be biased towards one's own ideas is dis-
cussed in Oliver A. Houck, Hard Choices: The Analysis of Alternatives Under Section
404 of the Clean Water Act and Similar Environmental Laws, 60 U. COLO. L. REV. 773
(1989). "[T]he human psyche" is a "formidable obstacle" to the consideration of alter-
natives. Id. at 774.
148. When a project developer turns in a project application, it is his desire to see
the project approved as quickly as possible. The legislature recognized these desires and
CEQA was amended to ensure a quick turnaround for project approvals. CAL. CODE
REGS. tit. 14, § 15108 (1990) (Lead agencies must complete and certify an EIR within
one year.). See also Barbara Sahm, Project Approval Under the California Environmen-
tal Quality Act: It Always Takes Longer Than You Think, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
579 (1979).
149. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21002 (West 1986) (Projects as proposed may be
rejected if feasible mitigation measures or alternatives are available to reduce environ-
mental impacts.).
150. This information was provided during a telephone conversation and meeting
with Serge Dedina, in Imperial Beach, Cal. (July 29, 1991 & Aug. 2, 1991). Mr. Dedina
is an environmental analyst with P & D Technologies of San Diego. Mr. Dedina
researches and prepares EIRs. He stated that most project developers are interested in
getting their projects approved, and the consideration of alternatives permits compliance
with CEQA. See also Ted Griswold, Wetland Protection Under Section 404 of the Clean
Water Act: An Enforcement Paradox, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 139, 177 (1990). Under
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, project applicants are allowed to provide their own
definition of the purpose of the project. This definition is later used to determine if there
there might be a better way to proceed than their own plans. One
commentator has noted that "the inquiry into alternatives is an in-
sult" to the project proponent who believes his plans are the most
suitable. 15 1
In addition to their inherent bias toward their own projects, pro-
ject developers generally choose and discuss alternatives merely to
protect themselves from citizens' suits. A recent survey conducted by
the Association of Bay Area Governments revealed that fifty-four
percent of the survey respondents said that legal defensibility, rather
than the true informational role, drives the CEQA process.15 2 Project
developers have become more interested in creating an EIR which is
"bullet proof' against legal challenge than in developing an EIR
which stimulates the discussion of alternatives.153
It is unrealistic to expect project developers, although well-versed
on the requirements of their projects, to diligently seek project alter-
natives." 4 Therefore, other parties more interested in finding envi-
ronmentally superior alternatives should be allowed to directly
participate in the process.
2. Subjectivity of Alternatives Choices and Public Isolation
from Analysis
"Feasibility" is a subjective term. What the developer or lead
agency deems as economically or technologically infeasible may not
be the same as what the public would deem infeasible. 15 By al-
lowing lead agencies and developers to pre-screen or censor potential
are practicable alternatives. Applicants generally define project so narrowly that alterna-
tives are rarely considered. Id. Although this example derives from the Clean Water Act,
it demonstrates project applicants' disregard for considering alternatives. See also
Houck, supra note 147.
151. Houck, supra note 147, at 774.
152. Timothy A. Tosta et al., Environmental Review After Goleta, 14 REAL PROP.
L. REP. 177, 179 (1991) (in general, supporting the supreme court decision in Goleta),
153. Telephone Interview and Meeting with Serge Dedina, Environmental Analyst,
in Imperial Beach, Cal. (July 29, 1991 & Aug. 2, 1991). Mr. Dedina stated that both
lead agencies and project developers are wary of citizens suits and they are interested in
"bullet proof" EIRs. See also Tosta, supra note 152, at 179 (shift "toward an environ-
mental document which is 'bullet proof' against legal challenge" as opposed to docu-
ments that assist in the decison-making process).
154. Regarding the motivations of lead agencies in general, one author has noted
that the prime motivating factor in local agency zoning decisions is "money" and the
need to increase the tax base. Bradley Inman, 'Guide to California Planning' Says the
State's System Has Failed, SAN DIEGO UNION, August 4, 1991, at F-3, col. 5. These
types of non-environmental motivations also tend to influence the amount of "diligence"
expended when considering project alternatives.
155. Reply to Amicus Curiae Briefs of California Cities and California Associa-
tion of Sanitation Agencies at 45, Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 52
Cal. 3d 553, 801 P.2d 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990) (No. S013629). One of the
arguments for allowing lead agencies and project developers to pre-screen feasible alter-
natives during the "scoping" or initial environmental analysis phase is to save the public
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alternatives without analysis in the EIR, the public is isolated from
the thought process or "analytic route" of the decision. CEQA is
founded on the ideal that the public holds a "privileged position" in
the decision making process. 15 Citizens are encouraged and ex-
pected to participate in the CEQA process.157 If the public does not
have access to an analysis of why alternatives were deemed infeasi-
ble, they cannot be as "equally informed" as the agency and, there-
fore, cannot fully participate in the environmental review process. 58
Additionally, the public should not be expected to "blindly trust"
the agencies labeling of alternatives as "infeasible" without an anal-
ysis in the EIR.159 As the Amicus of the Goleta decision noted, "an
agency may not demand blind trust by the public or the courts, nor
may it shield the manner in which it exercises its discretion from
scrutiny by censoring EIRs."' 60 An EIR is not intended to merely
from "confusion" and "misleading infeasible alternatives." Pre-screening proponents ar-
gue that "members of the public are not necessarily attuned to the legal and policy con-
straints on an agency's ability to select among alternatives. Analysis of conjectural
alternatives in an EIR can mislead the public into believing there is a wider range of
reasonable alternatives than actually exists." Id. However, this contention fails to take
into account the fact that just because the public does not agree with the agencies rea-
soning does not mean that the public is necessarily misled or confused.
156. Concerned Citizens of Costa Mesa v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural Ass'n, 42 Cal.
3d 929, 727 P.2d 1029, 231 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1986). "'[T]he "privileged position" that
members of the public hold in the CEQA process ... is based on a belief that citizens
can make important contributions to environmental protection and on notions of demo-
cratic decision-making .... ' " Id. at 936, 727 P.2d at 1033, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 752
(quoting Daniel P. Selmi, The Judicial Development of the California Environmental
Quality Act, 18 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 197, 215-16 (1984)).
157. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21000(e) (West 1991) ("Every citizen has a responsi-
bility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the environment.").
158. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 404, 764 P.2d at 291, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
The critical point is that the public must be equally informed. Id. To allow the lead
agency to rely on scoping to pre-screen alternatives without discussing them in EIR
would be to "sanction the avoidance of public discussion." Goleta, 216 Cal. App. 3d at
59, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 592.
159. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 404, 764 P.2d at 291, 276 Cal. Rptr. at 439.
The court would not "countenance a result that would require blind trust by the public,
especially in light of CEQA's fundamental that the public be fully informed." Id. Even
though an agency may be predisposed to determine an alternative is infeasible, the dis-
closure and discussion of the alternative may "foster reconsideration" and ultimately an
"environmentally preferable result." Reply to Amicus Curiae Briefs of California Cities
and California Association of Sanitation Agencies at 2, Citizens of Goleta Valley v.
Board of Supervisors, 52 Cal. 3d 553, 801 P.2d 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990) (No.
S013629).
160. Reply to Amicus Curiae Briefs of California Cities and California Associa-
tion of Sanitation Agencies at 4, Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors, 52
Cal. 3d 553, 801 P.2d 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990) (No. S013629).
dismiss or label alternatives. An EIR is intended to foster the discus-
sion of alternatives.' 61
Currently under CEQA no mechanism allows citizens' groups to
directly introduce project alternatives to the lead agency for detailed
environmental analysis and inclusion in the Final EIR. Although
lead agencies must respond to public and other agency comments
during the Draft EIR stage, CEQA sets few requirements regarding
1162the depth of analysis of the responses. At present, if citizens'
groups are not satisfied by the depth of analysis of alternatives in an
EIR, they must ultimately file suit challenging the EIRs suffi-
ciency.163 A mechanism is needed to allow public input regarding the
scope and level of analysis that alternatives receive. Litigation is not
the most efficient method to address these shortfalls.
3. Disregard for CEQA's Sequential Process
The Goleta decision allows the determination of "feasibility" to
enter the CEQA process at the EIR stage.16 4 However, the CEQA
guidelines, prior case law, and commentaries acknowledged that
"feasibility" should be considered at the project approval stage after
the preparation of the EIR.
California Public Resource Code section 21081 provides that
whenever one or more significant effects are identified in an EIR, the
agency may approve the project only if it determines one of the
following:
(a) Changes or alterations have been required in, or incorporated into, such
project which mitigate or avoid the significant environmental effects thereof
161. CAL. PUB, RES. CODE § 21002 (West 1986); CAL CODE REcS. tit. 14§ 15126(d)(5) (1991) ("Key issue... discussion of alternative"). "CEQA is intended to
promote genuine investigation and consideration of alternatives which will reduce harm
to the environment." Reply to Amicus Curiae Briefs of California Cities and California
Association of Sanitation Agencies at 2, Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervi-
sors, 52 Cal. 3d 553, 801 P.2d 1161, 276 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1990) (No. S013629).
162. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15088 (1991). The guidelines do not give the
specific level of analysis comments should receive (i.e., consideration and preparation of
analysis by environmental professional) but provide that a "good faith, reasoned analy-
sis" supported by 'factual information" is required.
163. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21177(a)-(e) (no person may bring a cause of action
alleging CEQA noncompliance unless generally some party has alleged grounds for non-
compliance and petitioner has objected to approval of project). Also, CEQA petitioners
generally must exhaust all administrative remedies prior to bringing suit for noncompli-
ance. California courts have not agreed on the specificity petitioners must provide in
stating their objections at an administrative level to qualify for exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies under CEQA. However, if the petitioner raises his objection before the
administrative agency with final decision making authority, then he has fulfilled the ex-
haustion of remedies requirement and may proceed with a CEQA suit. Browning-Ferris
Industries v. City Council, 181 Cal. App. 3d 852, 226 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578-79 (1986)
(objections made before City Council not required to be made before planning commis-
sion previously).
164. See supra text accompanying notes 124-42.
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as identified in the completed environmental impact report.
(b) Such changes or alterations are within the responsibility and jurisdic-
tion of another public agency and such changes have been adopted by such
other agency, or can and should be adopted by such other agency.
(c) Specific economic, social, or other considerations make infeasible the
mitigation measures or project alternatives identified in the environmental
impact report.169
Lead agencies should first identify potential alternatives in the
EIR and then determine during the project approval stage what
measures to undertake.1 66 Additional support for this two-step analy-
sis can also be found in case law. In two recent decisions the courts
acknowledged the two-step approach. In Kings County Farm Bureau
v. City of Hanford,16 7 the court stated:
The City has two obligations. It is responsible for ensuring the EIR con-
tains a meaningful discussion of alternatives ... and, if it concludes the
project will have one or more significant effects, it must make findings on
the record regarding the feasibility of such alternatives.168
The California Supreme Court in Laurel Heights also paid close
attention to the sequencing of the CEQA process. The court noted:
As a matter of logic, the EIR must be prepared before the decision to ap-
prove the project. Not until project approval does the agency determine
whether to impose any mitigation measures on the project .... [T]o say
that alternatives need not be discussed if there is a possibility that the
agency might adopt mitigation measures ... would invert the chronology of
the CEQA process. 69
The Laurel Heights court clearly acknowledged the sequential na-
ture of the EIR approval process as described in the guidelines.17 0
Commentators have also firmly acknowledged the two-step process
165. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081 (West 1986) (emphasis added). This section
expressly addresses the project approval stage and introduces the screening devise of "ec-
onomic, social, or other considerations" (feasibility) on those alternatives already identi-
fied in the EIR. Id.
166. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21081 (West 1986). See also Brief of Amici Curiae
Sierra Club, supra note 10, at 8-10. See also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, app. A CEQA
Process Flow Chart (1990). The flow chart shows the findings of feasibility of avoiding
significant environmental effects after the preparation and consideration for approval of
the Final EIR.
167. 221 Cal. App. 3d 692, 270 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1990).
168. Id. at 731, 270 Cal. Rptr. at 669 (emphasis added).
169. Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 401, 764 P.2d at 289, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 437
(emphasis added) (emphasis removed) (citation omitted).
170. Id. The Laurel Heights court also stated that California Public Resources
Code § 21002 "deals with public agencies' approval of projects, not with the contents of
an EIR." Id. at 401, 764 P.2d at 288, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 437 (emphasis added). It should
be noted that § 21002 is the section relied upon by the Goleta court to determine the
nature and scope of alternatives in the EIR. This interpretation of § 21002 is in direct
conflict with the Laurel Heights determination.
mandated by the CEQA guidelines.1
Allowing lead agencies to first determine whether alternatives are
feasible and then decide whether to include them in the EIR is not
compatible with the sequential process outlined in the CEQA guide-
lines. It also reduces the scope of potentially environmentally supe-
rior alternatives addressed in EIRs.172
B. The Potential Solution: Direct Public Submittal
of Alternatives
The California Legislature can, and should, take a number of
steps in order to address the problems of ensuring that the optimum
range of alternatives are considered in an EIR, encouraging public
participation early in the review process, and reducing CEQA-re-
lated litigation. The legislature needs to realize that project develop-
ers and project opponents have competing interests when it comes to
the discussion of alternatives in EIRs.17 3
The project developer wishes to ensure compliance with CEQA to
avoid costly delays and court challenges. The project opponent
wishes to see a broad assortment of alternatives to ensure that the
optimum environmental decisions are made. In order to balance the
competing interests of project developers and project opponents, an
EIR should discuss a wide array of project alternatives. 174
171. Daniel P. Selmi, The Judicial Development of the California Environmental
Quality Act, 18 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 197 (1984).
In these amendments [to California Public Resources Code § 21002] the
legislature required a two-step approach. The public agency first identifies envi-
ronmental impacts and determines whether there are alternatives or mitigation
measures that would avoid the project's impacts. In the second step, the agency
broadens its analysis. Still focusing on alternatives and mitigation measures, it
determines whether they are "feasible" by considering economics, social fac-
tors, and "other conditions."
Id. at 261. See also Brief of Amici Curiae Sierra Club, supra note 10, at 8-10.
172. This initial focus based upon economic, social, or technological factors nar-
rows the scope of potential environmentally superior alternatives. Allowing the screening
of alternatives based on non-environmental factors reduces the impact of an EIR as a
purely environmental document. See supra text accompanying notes 12-I5 (initial legis-
lative purpose to provide separate environmental analysis). See also Brief of Amici Cu-
riae Sierra Club, supra note 10, at 4.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 147-54. Acknowledging the divergent
views of project developers and project opponents will increase in importance as project
developers gain more control over the contents of EIRs. A recent appellate court decision
has held that a project applicant may complete and submit the Final EIR if the lead
agency reviews the report's contents. In this manner, the project applicant has almost
complete control over the scope of alternatives in the EIR. Friends of La Vina v. County
of Los Angeles, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1446, 284 Cal Rptr. 171 (1991).
174. This view is consistent with the Laurel Heights view that one of an EIRs'
"major functions" is to ensure that "all reasonable alternatives" should be discussed.
Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d at 404, 764 P.2d at 288, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 439. See supra
text accompanying notes 115-21.
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1. Benefits of Proposed CEQA Amendment
If citizens' groups were allowed and encouraged to directly partici-
pate in choosing alternatives for in-depth analysis in the Final EIR,
the following three important goals would be met:
(1) A wider assortment of project alternatives would be analyzed in an En-
vironmental Impact Report.
(2) There would be an increase in public participation earlier in the project
review process.
(3) A reduction in CEQA-related litigation regarding project alternatives
would also result.
2. How the Legislative Changes Would Work
CEQA should be amended to allow citizens' groups to submit up
to three project alternatives to the lead agency during the comment
review period for Draft EIRs.1' These three proposed alternatives
would then be subjected to an in-depth environmental analysis and
guaranteed inclusion in the project's Final EIR.17 ' The three pro-
posed alternatives would be analyzed regardless of whether the lead
agency and project developer deemed them feasible. By allowing an
alternatives inclusion in an EIR regardless of whether the lead
agency deems it feasible, citizens' groups would be able to overcome
the lead agencies' subjective determination of feasibility. 17 7 In this
manner, citizens' groups could have a direct impact on defining "fea-
sible alternatives" in project EIRs through their own submittals.
The amendment should also provide that if the citizens' groups
submit more than three alternatives, then the groups should be noti-
fied and given the opportunity to come to a consensus on the three
most appropriate alternatives. If more than three alternatives are re-
ceived by the lead agency, the lead agency would notify all individu-
als and citizens submitting alternatives of the need to meet and
175. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15105 (1991) (requirement for Draft EIR review
period: "the public review period for a Draft EIR should not be less than 30 days nor
longer than 90 days except in unusual circumstances"). The review period in the pro-
posed amendment would remain the same in order to keep the project review process as
streamlined as possible. This would also ensure that the one year time limit for comple-
tion of CEQA review for private projects would be kept intact. CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 65950 (West 1986) (lead agency must act within one year on projects requiring EIRs).
176. Currently lead agency responses to comments made during the Draft EIR can
be included as a revision to the Draft EIR or as a separate section of the Final EIR. CAL.
CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15088(c) (1991). However the depth of analysis to comments is
not guaranteed. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15088(b) (1991). See supra text accompany-
ing note 162.
177. See supra text accompanying note 155.
choose the alternatives for analysis. If the parties could not meet or
come to a consensus regarding which three alternatives should be
submitted for in-depth analysis, then a representative from the lead
agency would choose the three most environmentally sensitive alter-
natives regardless of their feasibility. In this manner, at least three
more potentially environmentally superior alternatives would be ana-
lyzed in a project's EIR.
This "consensus" requirement would have two positive effects.
First, developers would be protected from the analysis expense of an
unreasonable number of project alternatives. Second, citizens' groups
would be encouraged to meet and arrive at a consensus regarding the
choice of environmentally optimum alternatives.
The developer would also be protected from unreasonable expense.
In any given project, the developer would only pay for a maximum
of three additional alternative analyses. Although requiring develop-
ers to provide for the analyses of the three additional alternatives is
an added expense, the burden to developers is not especially oner-
ous.178 According to at least one environmental analyst, the review of
individual off-site alternatives does not constitute a large percentage
of the cost to prepare the entire environmental review package.""
The "consensus" requirement would also create an incentive for
citizens' groups to meet and choose the three most reasonable and
environmentally superior alternatives. Citizens' groups, as project op-
ponents, have the greatest incentive to find and propose those alter-
natives that will actually meet the project objectives and provide the
greatest environmental protection. 180
Furthermore, the "consensus" requirement is the most fair way to
deal with multiple citizens' groups proposing multiple alternatives. If
the CEQA guidelines were amended to allow analysis of the first
178. It should be noted that only projects with significant environmental impact
require the submittal of a full EIR. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21100, 21150 (West 1986).
Many projects require only a filing of a Negative Declaration before approval. CAL. Pun.
RES. CODE § 21064 (West 1986); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15070 (1991). Addition-
ally, only those projects which are publicly controversial will evoke the submission of
additional project alternatives from citizens' groups. In many cases, the proposed CEQA
amendment will not effect the completion of the EIR.
179. Telephone Interview and Meeting with Serge Dedina, Environmental Analyst,
in Imperial Beach, Cal. (July 29, 1991 & Aug. 2, 1991). Mr. Dedina provided a cost
breakdown for a representative project. The expense of preparing alternative site analysis
constituted less than four percent of the total EIR package expense. Mr. Dedina stated,
that on average, an in-depth analysis of one off-site alternative requires approximately
eight person-hours. Project analysts are billed at $50.00 to $70.00 per hour and project
management is billed at $90.00 per hour. If the analysis of one site alternative was pre-
pared entirely by project management, the cost would be $720.00. The total cost to pre-
pare an analysis of three off-site alternatives would be approximately $2160.00
(assuming preparation entirely by project management). Mr. Dedina stated that his
firm's rates were representative for San Diego County.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 147-54.
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three alternatives or three randomly chosen alternatives, some citi-
zens' groups would have their choices analyzed while other groups
would not. By encouraging citizens' groups to reach a consensus,
each citizens' group will have the opportunity to present its alterna-
tives for consideration as one of the three project alternatives
ultimately chosen. This requirement rewards cooperation and con-
sensus among the citizens' groups.
Direct public submittal of project alternatives would also reduce
the amount of CEQA-related litigation. CEQA should be amended
to include a restriction on the individuals who can challenge the suf-
ficiency of alternatives analysis in EIRs. Only those individuals and
citizens' groups who actually participated in the Draft EIR comment
review by suggesting alternatives (even if not analyzed in the EIR)
should be allowed to challenge the sufficiency of the alternatives
analysis of an EIR.' 8 '
This limitation would have two important benefits. The first bene-
fit would be a reduction in the amount of CEQA-related litigation.
The second benefit would be to provide an incentive to the public for
early participation in the project review process.
CEQA-related litigation would be reduced because the number of
individuals who could challenge an EIR's alternative site analysis
would be limited to only those individuals who had suggested alter-
natives. Since the pool of individuals who could challenge the EIR
would be set at the Draft EIR stage, the result would be the reduc-
tion in the overall number of potential plaintiffs and, therefore, suits.
Furthermore, since the CEQA guidelines have strict notice provi-
sions regarding the availability of Draft EIRs, due process considera-
tions would not be ignored. 82
Citizens' groups would also be encouraged to participate earlier in
the project review process. The CEQA guidelines stress the impor-
tance of public participation throughout the project review pro-
cess.' 8  The legislature intended the public to have an active and
181. This suggested limitation parallels existing CEQA provisions requiring indi-
viduals to present alleged grounds for CEQA noncompliance during administrative pro-
ceedings before filing suit. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21177(a) (West 1986). Individuals
must also have objected to the approval of the project before filing suit. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 21177(b) (West 1986).
182. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21092(a)(1)-(3) (West 1986); CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
14, §§ 15087(a)(1)-(3) (1991). The notice must be given to all organizations and individ-
uals who have previously requested it, and all contiguous land owners if applicable. The
lead agency should also furnish copies of Draft EIRs to area public libraries and make
copies available at their office. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15087(e) (1991).
183. CAL CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15201 (1991) ("Public participation is an essential
important role in the CEQA process. 8
If citizens' groups submit their suggestions for project alternatives
early in the review process, their alternatives probably will have a
greater impact on the actual design of a project.' 85 Belated objec-
tions and litigation after the approval of the Final EIR are not as
productive as early project involvement.
Allowing direct public submittal of project alternatives would have
tangible benefits in land-use decisions. A wider range of alternatives
would be addressed in EIRs, the public would be encouraged to par-
ticipate earlier in the project review process, and CEQA-related liti-
gation would be reduced.
Although the public would have a larger role in choosing project
alternatives, these proposed CEQA amendments are not intended to
shift the burden of finding and discussing project alternatives from
the lead agency."86 The lead agency would still have the continued
responsibility to identify and comment upon those project alterna-
tives they deem feasible. 1 ' The proposed CEQA amendments are
intended to supplement a lead agency's analysis and to allow the
public a practicable vehicle for directly submitting project alterna-
tives for in-depth analysis in the Final EIR.
CONCLUSION
Since CEQA's inception, California courts have generally inter-
preted the CEQA guidelines very broadly. Early CEQA decisions set
an expansive tone for later court decisions. California courts will-
ingly looked beyond the specific verbiage of the guidelines in order to
support the ideal of providing the "fullest" environmental protection
possible.
part of the CEQA process. Each public agency should include provisions in its CEQA
procedures for wide public involvement.").
184. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000(c), (e), (f) (West 1986). See, e.g., County of
Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1178, 207 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1984) (relation-
ship between public and implementing agencies as "an interactive process"); Concerned
Citizens of Costa Mesa, Inc. v. 32nd Dist. Agricultural Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 929, 727 P.2d
1029, 231 Cal. Rptr. 748 (1986).
185. Additionally, if all suggestions for alternatives were presented and explored in
a limited time frame, the review of project alternatives could be undertaken at one time,
resulting in greater efficiency. The continual start-up and wind-down of analysis could be
avoided. Telephone Interview and Meeting with Serge Dedina, Environmental Analyst,
in Imperial Beach, Cal. (July, 29, 1991 & Aug. 2, 1991).
186. This view is consistent with Laurel Heights, 47 Cal. 3d 376, 764 P.2d 278,
253 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1988). The Laurel Heights court was unwilling to place the burden
of identifying and documenting project alternatives on the project opponent.
187. The lead agency under the proposed amendment would still be bound by the
CEQA provisions requiring the analysis of alternatives in EIRs and the consideration of
alternatives in project approval decisions. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21002.1(a), 21061
(West 1986); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 15126(d), (d)(3) (1991).
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California appellate and supreme court decisions molded and rede-
fined the role and requirements of Environmental Impact Reports in
land-use decisions. The required scope of alternative site analysis in
EIRs continued to develop and the "rule of reason" was announced.
In Laurel Heights, the supreme court reaffirmed the preeminence
that environmental considerations should be given in project deci-
sions. Laurel Heights broadly defined the parameters for adequate
alternative analysis under CEQA.
Two years later, in Goleta, the supreme court seemed to shrink
from the expansive environmental goals of CEQA. The court articu-
lated the new screening device of "feasibility" in addressing alterna-
tives analysis. "Feasibility" as defined by lead agencies and project
developers would limit the range of project alternatives considered in
an EIR. Lead agencies and project developers could pre-screen alter-
natives from analysis in EIRs.
Allowing feasibility to function as a screening device creates po-
tential problems in the project review process. The optimum alterna-
tives may not be considered, the public will not have as equal an
access to the information as lead agencies, and the sequencing of the
CEQA process is ignored, reducing the number of potential alterna-
tives that are considered.
Land-use decisions have important and long-term effects on the
quality of life in all California communities. If governmental deci-
sion makers are to choose the project alternatives with optimum eco-
nomic benefits and minimal environmental impact, they must have a
wide array of alternatives from which to choose. The legislature
should allow direct public participation in suggesting the choice of
alternatives discussed in EIRs. If the public were allowed to provide
a range of alternatives for in-depth analysis during the comment re-
view period of Draft EIRs, tangible benefits in land-use decisions
could be realized. Developers and project opponents could feel confi-
dent that all important alternatives were considered in the EIR. Pub-
lic participation in the review process would be enhanced. Future
CEQA-related litigation would be reduced. Finally, decision makers
would be provided with a wider range of alternatives to assist them
in making their decisions.
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